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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
' Case No. 
vs. ( 11052 
VAL TAYLOR, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLAN1' 
STATE.MENTO~--. NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff, STATE OF UTAH, 
against defendant, VAL TAYLOR, for a violation of 
Section 55-10-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended by the Laws of Utah, 1965, and more particu-
larly, Sub-section ( l), to-wit: 
"Any person eighteen ( 18) years of age or 
over who induces, aids, or encourages a child 
to violate any federal, state, or local law or mu-
nicipal ordinance, or who tends to cause children 
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to become or remain delinquent, or who aids, 
contributes to, or becomes responsible for the 
neglect or delinquency of any child." 
On the 15th day of February, 1967, Don Poulsen, 
a Murray City police officer, filed a Complaint in the 
Second District Juvenile Court as follows: 
"The undersigned, being duly sworn, com-
plains and alleges that the above defendant, over 
the age of 18 years, in the above stated County, 
State of Utah, did on or about the 9th day of 
February, 1967, commit the crime of contribut-
ing to the delinquency and neglect of Shana and 
Christine Sleater, children under the age of 18 
years as follows: At the time and place afore-
said, said defendant, while said children were 
in his custody, did take indecent.liberties on their 
persons, and did require and induce said Shana 
and Christine Sleater to perform oral sodomy 
on his person; the defendant, by reason of the 
above said acts did aid, contribute to, or become 
responsible for the neglect and delinquency of 
the said children." 
DISPOSITION IN THE JUVENILE COURT 
At the trial, the Honorable John Farr Larson, 
hearing the evidence without a jury, found the defend-
ant "guilty", a1_1d sentenced defendant to six ( 6) months 
in the county jail. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
By this appeal, defendant seeks to reverse the 
judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety and to 
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obtain a dismissal, or, in the alternative, that the 
matter be remanded to the Juvenile Court for a new 
trail. 
STATElHENT O:F' FACTS 
The defendant, VAL TAYLOR, was married to 
Carolyn Taylor on August 31, 1962, at Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Prior to the marriage of Carolyn Taylor to 
defendant, she had four ( 4) children, two ( 2) older 
boys, and two ( 2) girls, Shana Sleater and Christine 
Sleater, the girls in question in the trial, Shana Sleater 
being of the age of seven ( 7) years and Christine 
Sleater being of the age of six ( 6) years. The parties 
also have a child of their marriage, Ryne Taylor, who 
is four ( 4) years of age. 
The Complaint in question was signed after l\'Ir. 
and Mrs. Taylor had had marital difficulties and a time 
when the two girls were living with their grandparents, 
Arthur G. and Oneda I-Iedberg. 
Prior to the trial on the matter, defendant by and 
through his attorney had duly filed a Demand for Jury 
Trial ( R. 134). This matter was initially set for trial on 
the 21st day of April, 1967, and continued until July 
10, 1967. Pursuant to a telephone call from the Juvenile 
Court, defendant's attorney was informed if he insisted 
upon a jury trial in this matter that the matter would 
be transferred to a City court, and defendant's attor-
lley, ,vithout consultation with defendant, waived the 
jury trial. 
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At the trial on the matter, the only testimony on 
behalf of the State of Utah was the testimony of the 
two children, Shana Sleater and Christine Sleater 
( R. 4 through R. 36) . 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE JUVENILE COURT SHOULD HAVE 
GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DIS-
MISS ON THE BASIS OF ITS FAILURE TO 
PROVE THE COMl\tIISSION OF THE OF-
FENSE ALLEGED ON OR ABOUT THE 
9TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1967. 
On the trial of the matter, the only evidence as to 
the time that the alleged offense had occurred was on 
cross examination by l\1r. Olsen, attorney for defendant, 
said testimony of Shana Sleater being as follows: 
Q. Do you remember how long ago this was 
supposed to have happened, Shana? Was it 
a month ago? 
A. I don't know. 
Q .. You don't remember when this was supposed 
to have happened? How long before you 
went to live with your grandmother was it 
supposed to have happened? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you remember of telling this to a police-
man? 
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A. No. (R. 12, R. 13) 
Q. You don't know when this happened? 
A. No. 
Q. Was it a year ago? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Two years ago? 
A. I don' tknow. (R. 17, L. 15 thru 20) 
On direct examination of Christine Sleater by l\lr. 
Hansen, Deputy County Attorney, as to when the act 
was supposed to have occurred, the following evidence 
was given: 
Q. What time of the day-do you remember 
when it happened? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember? 
A. Yeah, I remember it was last year. (R. 25, 
L. 31, R. 26, L. 1 thru 3) 
Further, on cross examination of Christine Sleater, 
the following testimony was given: 
Q. Do you remember how long ago this was 
supposed to have happened, Christy, before 
you went to live with your grandma? 
I. It happened the day-it happened when we 
were moving to a-it happened when-I 
don't know. (R. 29, L. 22 thru 26) 
Q. Do you remember the day the house caught 
on fire? 
A. No. 
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Q. Don't you remember the day the house caught 
on fire? 
A. No, but I knew it got on fire. 
Q. 'Vas this before or after that? 
A. No. 
Q. Was it before? 
A. I don't know when it was. 
Q. You just don't know when it was? Could it 
have been last year? 
A. I don't know. It was last year when I lived 
with him. That is when the fire was. 
Q. Were you going to school part of the day? 
Was it during school time? 
A. No. 
Q. It wasn't during school time? 
A. No. 
Q. You were home all day? 
A. No, we just got-we just-it wasn't school 
when we did it. (R. 31, L. II thru 31. R. 32, 
L. I) 
It is admitted that the State is not required to 
establis4 that the crime was committed on the precise 
date alleged in the Complaint. However, the State al-
leges in said Complaint that the crime was committed 
on or about the 9th day of February, 1967, and is 
required by taking such election as to date to show 
that the crime in fact was committed on or about the 
date as alleged by said Complaint. This principle was 
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applied in State v. Pace, 187 Ore. 498, 212 P. 2d 755, 
in which case the defendant was accused of sexual inter-
course with a minor daughter. The Oregon court ruled 
as follows: 
"The state was not required to establish that 
the crime was committed on the precise date al-
leged in the indictment. It was, however, in 
keeping with its election, required to show that 
the crime was committed 'on or about August 
20, 1948'. The state, in using the words 'on or 
about' in making its election, did not thereby put 
the time of the offense at large, but meant that 
the time, August 20, 1948, was stated v1rith proxi-
mate accuracy." 
See also Stephen v. State, 207 Ind. 388, 193 N.E. 375; 
Crawford v. Arends, 351 l\iio. llOO, 176 S.,¥". 2d. 1. 
Further, in the case of State v. Rodman, 44 N.1\1. 
162, 99 P. 2d. 711, in which case the defendant had 
been charged with statutory rape, the New l\iexico 
court stated: 
"To men of common sense, as members of a 
jury or presumed to be, the expression 'on or 
about' does not mean a variation of three or four 
months. The common understanding of the words 
'on or about' when used in connection with a 
definite point of time, is that they do not put the 
time at large, but indicate that it is stated with 
approximate accuracy." 
As stated in 23 C .J. S., Criminal Law, Section 
1196, Page 746: 
"'Vhere the prosecution elects to proceed for 
an offense as of a certain date, the instructions 
7 
should limit the jury to finding whether the of-
fense was committed on that date." 
Further, in State v. MacMillan, 46 Ut. 19, 145 P. 
833, a case involving indecent liberties with a minor 
child, the defendant by way of appeal urged that the 
time that the alleged offense was committed was not 
proven. The Utah court stated: 
"It is true the little girl could not give the 
date, nor the month, nor the year; but the time 
was sufficiently proved by other facts and cir-
cumstances." 
In the case now before this court, there was no 
other testimony whatsoever by any persons except the 
six and seven year old children, and as such there were 
no other facts, circumstances or testimony which would 
in any way allow the court to come to any conclusion 
by which it could be determined that the crime, if 
committed, could have been committed on or about 
the 9th day of February, 1967. 
Point 2. 
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN CONVICTION. 
As stated previously, the only evidence presented 
by the State was the testimony of the two minor chil-
dren, ages six and seven ( R. 4 through R. 36) . From 
the general reading of the testimony of these young 
young childretn, the court should have dismissed the 
action as being not in harmony with general experience, 
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coupled with the doubtful testamentary capacity of 
said minor children, and further, from a general reading 
of the testimony it should appear clear to this court 
that said children did not have testamentary capacity. 
In regard to capacity, see the questioning by Mr. 
Hansen of Shana Sleater, R. 4, wherein Shana gave 
no answers which appear on the record as to ability 
of whether Shana knew the difference between right 
and wrong or the penalty or punishment as to lying, 
and further, see the following testimony as to lying: 
Q. Do you ever lie? 
A. Sometimes. (R. 5, L. 9) 
Further, on cross examination by the defendant's at-
torney: 
Q. Do you know what a lie is, Shana? 
A. No. (R. 18, L. 13) 
Q. Have you ever had a whipping for telling 
lies? 
A. Yes. (R. 21, L. 8) 
See also cross examination of Christine Sleater by 
defendant's attorney: 
Q. Now, Christy, have you ever had a spanking 
for telling lies? 
A. Yes. (R. 28, L. 17) 
In regard to testimony as to the coaching of the 
children, see the following on cross examination by 
defendant's attorney of Shana Sleater: 
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Q. Now, Shana, did somebody tell you to say 
these things in court today? 
A. My mother did. 
Q. Your mother did? Have you talked to your 
grandmother about it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she go over the story with you? 
A. Yes. (R. 12, L through 14) 
Q. Did your grandmother tell you to tell these 
things in court? 
A. Yes. (R. 13, L. 24) 
Also, in examination by defendant's attorney of 
Mrs. Oneta Hedberg, the children's grandmother, with 
whom the children had been living, Mrs. Hedberg ad-
mitted going over the story with the children both prior 
to talking to the Deputy County Attorney and before 
coming to court ( R. 73 and 7 4) . 
In the examination by Nolan J. Olsen, attorney 
for defendant, of Mrs. Carolyn Tayor, the mother of 
the children, Mrs. Taylor stated emphatically that the 
children had never at any time mentioned the alleged 
occurrence to their mother. More particularly, see testi-
mony questions and answers as follows: 
Q. Did these children ever mention anything to 
you about an alleged offense? 
A. No. 
Q. Never? 
A. Never. 
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Q. \Vhen did you first hear about this offense? 
A. On February 14. 
Q. Hut they never said anything to you? 
A. They never said anything to me. ( R. 46 and 
47) 
In regard to testamentary capacity, it is admitted 
that a child of any age can testify if they meet certain 
qualifications. In this regard, \Vhigmore on Evidence, 
Section 495, sets out the basis as follows: 
" ( 1) First, it involves a capacity mentally at 
understand the nature of questions put and 
to form and communicate intelligent an-
swers. 
( 2) Secondly, does it involves a sense of moral 
responsibility, of the duty to make the 
narration correspond to the recollection and 
knowle ... dge ,that is, to speak the truth as 
he sees it? It would seem that the clear 
absence of such a sense would disqualify 
the witness." 
'I'his test was set forth in State v .Williams, 111 Ut. 
347, 180 P. 2d 551, which was a case involving the rape 
of a thirteen ( 13 year old girl, in which case the court 
decided that the thirteen year old girl, who had a mental 
age of between eight and ten, did not meet the test 
set forth by Mr. \Vhigmore. Further, the court stated: 
"\Ve have before us not merely a happening 
which must be considered not in harmony with 
general experience, coupled with the doubtful 
testimonial capacity of the only witness to the 
principal fact in issue." 
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In the case of State v. Madrid, 7 4 Ida. 200, 259 
P. 2d. 1044, the father of an eleven ( 11) year old 
daughter was convicted of committing lewd and lasci-
vious acts upon her, and the Idaho court reversed, 
stating: 
"Our public policy requires corrobation of 
testimony of the complaining witness in the 
prosecution for lewd and lascivious acts, either 
by direct evidence or evidence of surrounding 
circumstances, which clearly corroborate the 
statements made by the complaining witness." 
Further, in People v. Evans, 39 C.A. 2d., 242, 246 
P. 2d, 636, the California court in reversing a conviction 
for molesting of a IOl/2 year old girl stated: 
"Although her testimony was not inherently 
improbable as to be worthy of no belief, it was 
open to attack on the ground that it shows that 
she had been suggestively questioned as to the 
crime by the police." 
In the text, General View of the Criminal Law of 
England, by J. F. Stephen, the following appears: 
"A child will have been taught to say that, 
if it tells a lie, it will go to the bad place when 
it dies (which, usually taken to show that it knows 
the meaning of an oath) long before it has any 
real. notion of the practical importance of its 
evidence in a temporal point of view; and also 
long before it has learned to distinguish between 
its memory and its imagination, or to understand 
in the least degree, what is meant by accuracy 
of expression. It is hardly possible to cross ex-
amine a child, for the test to too rough for an 
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immature mind. However gently the questions 
may be put, the witness grows confused and 
frightened, partly by the tax on its memory, 
partly by the strangeness of the scene; and the 
result is that its evidence goes to the jury prac-
tically unchecked, and has usually greater weight 
than it deserves, for the sympathies of the jury 
are always with it. This is a considerable evil, 
for in infancy the strength of the imagination 
is out of all proportion to the power of the 
other faculties; and children constantly say what 
is not true, not from deceitfulness, but simply 
because they have come to think so, by talking 
or dreaming of what has passed." 
Based upon the evidence and the general tenor 
of testimony of the two young girls as to understanding, 
coupled with the fact that testimony was given as to 
coaching, and, further, that the children at no time 
had ever mentioned the acts in question to their mother, 
and, further, coupled with the evidence of the grand-
parents and the mother as to the bitterness and hatred 
toward the defendant by the grandparents, the Hed-
bergs, the court should have granted a dismissal on 
the basis that the prosecution did not meet the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was guilty of the crime as alleged. 
Point 3. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN NOT ALLO,VING DEFENDANT TO RE-
CALL PROSECUTION WITNESSES FOR 
FURTHER CROSS EXAMINATION. 
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Because of the inconsistency in the testimony of 
the grandparents, Hedbergs, and the mother, Carolyn 
Taylor, and the testimony of the two infant children, 
defendant should have been given an opportunity to 
further cross examine the said children. 
In this regard, it is recognized that it is left to 
the court's discretion as to recalling a witness for 
further cross examination unless it can be shown that 
the denial to recall said witness is a manifest abuse of 
discretion. 
Due to the fact that the entire case of the prose-
cution was based on the testimony of the two young ! 
girls, a recall of said girls should have been allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in not 
granting defendant's motion to dismiss at the conclu-
sion of the State's evidence based on the State's failure 
to show a time sequence as alleged by the Complaint 
wherein the Complaint alleged that the act occurred 
on or about the 9th day of February, 1967, and having 
made an election as to the time of said act the State 
was required to show that the act was committed on 
or about said date. Further, based on the over-all testi-
mony, the court should have granted a dismissal based 
on the failure of the State to meet the burden of proof 
as being not in harmony with general experience, 
coupled with the doubtful testimonial capacity of the 
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two very young witnesses, and it is submitted that the 
judgment heretofore entered by the Juvenile Court 
should be dismissed, or, in the alternative, that it Le 
remanded to the Juvenile Court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Val Taylor 
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